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THE UNITED MALL OF AMERICA: FREE SPEECH,
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE GROWING
FORTRESS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Jennifer Niles Coffin*
Scholars have called the shopping mall the modern replacement for the traditional
town square, a claim that is supported by both public investment in infrastruc-
ture through municipal and state bond issues and by the presence of public
services and events in many malls. Mall owners and tenants have exploited this
quasi public character by inviting government agencies to become tenants in the
malls ("City Hall at the Mall") despite claiming that malls are private property
where constitutionally protected freedoms do not apply. After an initial and short-
lived ruling that mall visitors do indeed have free speech rights, the Supreme
Court has held that the standard constitutional protection for political speech
does not apply to malls and shopping centers because no state action is involved.
Many, though not all, state courts have agreed with the Supreme Court's rul-
ing. This Note addresses two kinds of evolution: the legal evolution of free
speech law as it relates to shopping malls, with particular attention to the
Minnesota Supreme Court's recent rejection of free speech protection in State v.
Wicklund; and the cultural evolution in which our public spaces have become
private fortresses, "protected" from political speech in the interests of providing
"safe" and unmolested shopping experiences for consumers. The Note then dis-
cusses the common rationale underlying the decisions in a handful of state courts
that have extended free speech protection to those who wish to protest, leaflet, or
picket at malls. Based on these decisions, the author argues that state courts
should be more flexible in their balancing of free speech rights and property rights
if we are to stem an evolutionary process in which our public space becomes a vast
emporium where citizens are encouraged to buy but forbidden to speak.
INTRODUCTION
"THINK OF IT AS EVOLUTION IN ACTION."'
The setting is sometime in the future. Todos Santos, a massive
fortress-like structure, rises ominously from the outskirts of a
* B.A. 1995, University of Tennessee; J.D. 2000, University of Tennessee College of
Law. Clerk 2000-02, Hon. Thomas K. Moore, District Judge, U. S. Virgin Islands. I would
like to thank Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds for his continued support and guidance and
Judge Danny C. Boggs, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, for bringing
Niven & Pournelle's futuristic private mall-city to my attention.
1. LARRY NIVEN &JERRY POURNELLE, OATH OF FEALTY 101,323 (1981).
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crime-ravaged Los Angeles.2 Todos Santos is a completely self-
contained city, modeled after the Utopian arcologies designed by
architect and philosopher Paolo Soleri in the 1950s. 3 This futuristic
arcology, however, is owned by a huge foreign corporation to
whom it must answer for its profits and losses. Notably, Todos
Santos is constructed entirely around the most popular shopping
mall in Los Angeles. Lucky residents, selected upon application by
an elite committee, live, work, go to school, and shop inside Todos
Santos, never needing to leave its confines. In exchange for
protection, harmony, and police order, residents of Todos Santos
are fiercely loyal to the corporation and readily submit to constant
surveillance.4 While outsiders are permitted access to the shopping
areas of Todos Santos, the corporation fiercely reserves its rights as
a private property owner to eject unwanted intruders. A sign on a
private entrance to the mall-city states simply, "IF YOU GO
THROUGH THIS DOOR, YOU WILL BE KILLED. 5
Not surprisingly, local outsiders resent the mall-city. Small
groups of protesters picket the perimeter of the mall, carrying
signs that read "END THE NEST BEFORE IT ENDS
HUMANITY."6 From time to time, members of an organization
known as "Friends of Man and the Earth" infiltrate and sabotage
the enterprise, believing that Todos Santos wastefully consumes
vast resources for an elite few.7 One night, a Todos Santos security
officer fulfills the threat emblazoned on the sign at the mall-city's
entrance when "terrorist" intruders enter the building. Two young
trespassers are killed by poison gas. The Los Angeles police bring
charges, but in the end, the residents and administrators of Todos
Santos prevail over the Los Angeles government. The mall-city and
its private interests are vindicated. Eerily, the owners of Todos
2. Science fiction authors Larry Niven andJerry Pournelle set the scene of their 1981
novel, Oath of Fealty, in a futuristic mall-city outside Los Angeles. Id. at 21-26.
3. "Arcology" is Paolo Soleri's radical concept of urban development in which
planned cities fuse architecture with ecology. According to this theory, crowding is not seen
as an evil but as a necessary component of evolution. Soleri envisions a self-contained, pe-
destrian-centered city as a compact, complex "organism." According to Soleri, "Arcology is
the methodology that recognizes the necessity of the radical reorganization of the sprawling
urban landscape into dense, integrated, three-dimensional cities .... A central tenet of
Arcology is that the city is the necessary instrument for the evolution of [humankind]."
Paolo Soleri, The City of the Future, in EARTH'S ANSWER 72, 74 (1977). Soleri's philosophy
rejects the structure and effects of suburbia: "Life's bulk is negated when megalopoly and subur-
bia are taken as the environmental bulk." PAOLO SOLERI, ARCOLOGY: THE CITY IN THE IMAGE OF
MAN 1 (1969).
4. NIVEN & POURNELLE, supra note 1, at 36 ("[T] he residents want surveillance.... A
kind of siege mentality- ").
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 52-53.
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Santos escape, and, emboldened by their victory, the residents be-




While modern shopping malls may not offer the amenities of a
Todos Santos of science fiction origins, they are nevertheless much
more than mere groupings of retail establishments. In fact, in their
efforts to attract consumers, shopping malls often offer a wide va-
riety of nonretail services. Indeed, it is no longer unusual to find
U.S. postal stations, community centers, police substations, and
early voting centers in shopping malls. Nor is it unusual for hotels
to be part of shopping malls, as in the Galleria Plaza in Houston,
Texas,9 or an integral element of a hotel-mall combination, as in
the Peachtree Plaza in Atlanta, Georgia.' Political candidates
speak at malls;" assisted-living facilities transport elderly residents
to the mall for afternoon outings; 12 and children flock to the mall
on Halloween for trick-or-treating.' 3 Some malls contain chapels
that hold regular Sunday church services.
14 Some have libraries. 5
The shopping mall also hosts antique shows, beauty contests, and
local art shows. 6 On Friday nights, parents drop off their teenagers
at the mall, where they engage in the age-old ritual of "hanging
out.'' 7 Some malls open their common areas early for mallwalkers,
primarily elderly people engaging in light exercise. 8 As more of
8. Id. at 323.
9. WILLIAM SEVERINI KowINSKI, THE MALLING OF AMERICA 245 (1985). Although his
book came out in 1985, Kowinski's descriptions of modem shopping malls remain accurate.
For a recent update on the myriad offerings of the modern shopping mall, see Mark C.
Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1, 2-7 (1999). Professor Alexander conducted a survey of 100 of the largest malls in
the United States, with twenty-eight malls completing most of the survey. Id. at 3 n.3.
10. KOWINSKI, supra note 9, at 276 (describing Peachtree Plaza as an opulent "tour de
force" hotel connected to a shopping mall and surrounded by offices and condominiums).
11. Id. at 357.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Professor Alexander reports that "every Halloween, 10,000 children trick or treat
at the Walden Galleria in Buffalo, New York." Alexander, supra note 9, at 6.
14. KOWINSKI, supra note 9, at 129 (relating the author's attendance at the regular
Sunday church service held in the basement community room at Rosedale Mall, a Minne-
sota shopping center).
15. Id. at 358.
16. Alexander, supra note 9, at 6.
17. Id. at2.
18. IRA G. ZEPP, JR., THE NEW RELIGIOUS IMAGE OF URBAN AMERICA: THE SHOPPING
MALL AS CEREMONIAL CENTER 169-70 (2d ed. 1997).
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our public life takes place in shopping malls, local and federal
government agencies have responded by taking their services, in-
cluding services of the Department of Labor, the Division of Motor
Vehicles, "a city treasurer, a state auditor, and a U.S. Congressional
representative," to these malls. I9 In perhaps the most straightfor-
ward arrangement, a mall located at the outskirts of Knoxville,
Tennessee-curiously named Knoxville Center-leases space to
both the city and county in order to provide essential city and
county services. In an effort to "take the services to the people, 20
the city invites Knoxville citizens to visit "City Hall at the Mall" to
pay their property taxes, renew their driver's licenses, conduct post
office business, and apply for marriage licenses from 10:00 A.M. to
9:00 P.M., including Saturdays.21 In addition, Knoxville Center
houses a fully operational police precinct, which includes a com-
munity meeting room available to local community groups by
22
reservation.
Commentators have attempted to describe in academic terms
the phenomenon of modern shopping malls. For example, one
commentator has concluded that the modern shopping mall "is
the formal garden of late twentieth-century culture":
2 3
The contemporary American shopping mall is a commodified
version of the great garden styles of Western history with
which it shares fundamental characteristics. Set apart from
the rest of the world as a place of earthly delight like the me-
dieval walled garden; filled with fountains, statuary, and
ingeniously devised machinery like the Italian Renaissance
garden; designed on grandiose and symmetrical principles
like the seventeenth-century French garden; made up of
fragments of cultural and architectural history like the eight-
19. Alexander, supra note 9, at 7 (citing his mall survey). Professor Alexander notes
that several of these governmental offices actually lease space at the mall. Id.
20. Telephone Interview with Kathy Darnell, Policy Analyst, Department of Admin.,
City of Knoxville, Tenn. (Apr. 14, 1999).
21. CITY OF KNOXVILLE, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CITY SERVICES 17 (Fall 1998).
22. Id. at 34.
23. Richard Keller Simon, The Formal Garden in the Age of Consumer Culture: A Reading of
the Twentieth-Century Shopping Mall, in MAPPING AMERICAN CULTURE 231, 231 (Wayne Frank-
lin & Michael Steiner eds., 1992). By "formal garden," Simon refers to a planned garden
whose style reflects the architectural, philosophical, and social values of a given historical
moment: "[T]he mall's appropriation of history into idealized spaces of consumption can
be nostalgia or parody, or both at the same time.... [W]here once the vista was of the
grandeur of nature, it is now of the grandeur of manufactured commodities, the second
'nature' of capitalist economy." Id. at 236-41. Simon also notes that "[t]he mall is an artful
conflation of [the public park and the department store]. The shops and streets of the town
enter the park, but the disorderly world of which they are a part does not." Id. at 245.
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eenth-century irregular English garden; and set aside for the
public like the nineteenth-century American park, the mall is
the next phase of this garden history, a synthesis of all these
styles that have come before.24
Shopping malls have been proclaimed the cathedrals of the re-
ligion of consumerism,' modern pleasure domes, 6 the "accidental
capitals of suburbia,, 27 and private fortresses in which citizens en-
gage in an exchange of loyalty reminiscent of feudal relationships
from the Middle Ages. s One feminist critic has described shopping
malls as "substitute cit[ies]" 29 that reflect the "social power and
status associated with [gender and economic class]."3° The shop-
ping center industry itself has commented on its vision of
shopping malls, declaring, among other things, that shopping
centers are "the new downtowns.'1 Some legal scholars and
judges have described shopping malls as the modern equivalent
of the town square or open marketplace of former times. 32 In
24. Id. at 231-32.
25. See ZEPPJR., supra note 18, at 124-41.
26. See John Hannigan, The Saturday Essay: Who Wants to Spend Their Life in a Theme
Park?, INDEP. (LONDON), Nov. 28, 1998, T1, at 7. Hannigan cites writer Paul Goldberger,
who labels the newest theme-park malls "urbanoid environments" and compares these malls
to the "pod-bred clones in the science-fiction movie, Invasion of the Body Snatchers." Id. Han-
nigan notes that "[malls] seem to be genuine, but something is not quite right. What is
missing is a sense of the serendipity, diversity and humanity of traditional street life." Id.
27. KowINSKI, supra note 9, at 139.
28. See KOWINSKI, supra note 9, at 389-94; see also Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl,
Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make the Cal" 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
509, 536 (1996) (referring to the mall as a "modern private fortress").
29. LESLIE KANES WEISMAN, DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT 46 (1992).
30. Id. at 4. Weisman concludes:
[M] ails are neither cities nor suburbs, though they incorporate spatial elements of
both. They are racially and economically homogeneous, culturally arid environments
skillfully shaped by the hands of merchandisers to promote profits. Malls are insular
fantasy worlds where the relatively well-off pursue the study and acquisition of super-
fluous goods as a form of entertainment, in a society in which millions are in
desperate need of something to eat and a safe, warm place to sleep. The mall is the
quintessential embodiment of patriarchal dichotomies.
Id. at 49.
31. Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 168
n.19 (1980) (quoting SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Feb. 1972, at 52).
32. See id. at 168; see also NewJersey Coalition v.J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 768
(N.J. 1994); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping Centers and
Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1229, 1229 (1999) ("Proliferating and ever-
expanding malls, usually located along or adjacent to major highways, increasingly have
come to replace traditional municipalities as loci for the conduct of a host of activities.").
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these attempts to formally describe and categorize the modern
shopping mall, patrons are described as consumers who have en-
tered a public arena to engage in behavior that reflects our
modern understanding of public citizenship.3 However, in one
significant area, one inexorably linked with our notions of individ-
34ual rights, mall patrons do not enjoy full citizenship: freedom of
In New Jersey Coalition, Chief Justice Wilentz commented upon the statistical growth of
shopping malls and their displacement of traditional town squares:
Statisticians and commentators, however, are not needed: a walk through downtown
and a drive through the suburbs tells the whole story. And those of us who have lived
through this transformation know it as an indisputable fact of life, and that fact does
not escape the notice of this Court.
650 A.2d at 768.
33. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 23, at 233 ("Visitors learn the meanings of a consumer
society at the mall, not only in the choices they make in their purchases, but also in the
symbol systems they walk through... "); see also JOHN FISKE, READING THE POPULAR 14
(1989). Fiske writes: "[S]hopping malls and the cultural practices... that take place within
them [] are key arenas of struggle, at both economic and ideological levels, between those
with the power of ideological practice ... and those whose construction as subjects in ideol-
ogy is never complete .... Shopping is the crisis of consumerism .... " Id.
34. In one of the more famous passages concerning First Amendment jurisprudence,
Justice Brennan wrote in New York Times v. Sullivan: "[W]e consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Similarly, in 1927,Justice Brandeis wrote:
[Those who won our independence] believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. [Tihey knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope
and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through pub-
lic discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring), quoted in Bock
v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 57 (Colo. 1991); see also Marie A. Failinger, Five Modern
Notions in Search of an Author: The Ideology of the Intimate Society in Constitutional Speech Law, 30
U. TOL. L. REV. 251, 255 (1999)("[Slpeech is a critical part of creating a public commu-
nity .. "). See generally David S. Allen, The Supreme Court and the Creation of an (In)active
Public Sphere, in FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 93 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds., 1995) (comparing historical and
modern notions of public citizenship and discussing the Supreme Court's approach to
freedom of expression); Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American
[VOL. 33:4
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speech. Upon crossing the threshold of a privately-owned shop-
ping mall, a mall patron enters private property. Because the mall
is not a government actor, the First Amendment does not protect
the mall patron's speech from suppression by mall owners." Thus,
despite consensus among commentators that those who visit malls
do so in order to consciously or unconsciously manifest modern
notions of public interaction, mall patrons in fact become merely
temporary "citizens" of the private corporations who own the
malls. As "mall-citizens," patrons possess only those rights normally
accorded to any person invited onto private property, rights that
are determined by the applicable state law.
This Note addresses the evolution of the law of free speech as it
relates to shopping malls. Part II briefly traces the short life of First
Amendment protection for mall visitors and the birth of a theory
of free speech as guaranteed by state constitutional free speech
provisions. Part III examines the rationale of various state supreme
courts that have addressed the question of whether their state con-
stitution affords greater protection of speech than the First
Amendment in the context of shopping malls. Part IV analyzes
36the recent decision in State v. Wicklund, in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to extend free speech rights to visitors
of the vast archetypical shopping mall, the Mall of America in
Bloomington, Minnesota. 37 Part V discusses the "mailing of City
Hall," pointing to Knoxville Center in Tennessee, which leases
space to the city for its "City Hall at the Mall." This Part encourages
state courts to consider the wisdom of the various rationales ap-
plied by state supreme courts and suggests that a rigid application
of the state action doctrine contributes to the increasing suffoca-
tion of public discourse by private ownership in our consumption-
driven culture. The Note concludes that as more government and
other public entities become lessees of private property owners,
state courts should participate in the evolution of malls into public
spaces by exercising their authority to protect their citizens' free
speech rights.
Federalism: Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA.J. Soc. POL' & L. 683 (1997)(discussing the legal
status of notions of community and public citizenship).
35. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976); see also infra note 74
(describing state cases in which an analogous rationale is applied under state free speech
provisions). The so-called "state action doctrine" is the primary barrier to finding mall own-
ers responsible for protecting the free speech rights of mall patrons. See infra note 75
(providing a brief explanation of the origins and development of the state action doctrine,
as well as the scholarly debate surrounding it).
36. 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
37. Id. at 799.
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SHOPPING
MALLS: A SHORT HISTORY
The high-water mark for the notion that mall owners may not
suppress free expression on mall property came in 1968. In an
opinion by justice Thurgood Marshall, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc. 8 recognized that suburban shopping malls had replaced the
traditional urban town square and downtown business districts:
[T] he roadways provided for vehicular movement within the
mall and the sidewalks leading from building to building are
the functional equivalents of the streets and sidewalks of a
normal municipal business district. The shopping center
premises are open to the public to the same extent as the
commercial center of a normal town. So far as can be deter-
mined, the main distinction in practice between use by the
public of the Logan Valley Mall and of any other business dis-
trict ... would be that those members of the general public
who sought to use the mall premises in a manner contrary to
the wishes of the [owners] could be prevented from so do-
39ing.
The reasoning in Logan Valley was based primarily upon the doc-
trine articulated in the well-known "company town" case, Marsh v.
Alabama.4° In Marsh, the Court held that the First Amendment pro-
tected the speech rights of a Jehovah's Witness proselytizing on the
streets of Chickasaw, Alabama.41 At that time, the town of Chicka-
saw was wholly owned by the steel mill at which most of the
residents were employed.42 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
reasoned that because Chickasaw displayed many of the attributes
of a municipality, the state action requirement was satisfied for
constitutional free speech purposes.43 As stated in Marsh, "[t]he
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use
38. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
39. Id. at 319.
40. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
41. Id. at 506.
42. Id. at 502.
43. Id. at 508.
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it."" Striking a balance, the Court determined that the free speech
rights of the citizen were paramount to the property rights asserted
45by the company.
The vitality of the company-town analogy in Logan Valley was
short-lived, however, with the first blow against it coming in the
Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.6 In Lloyd, the Court held
that war protestors enjoyed no First Amendment protection at
shopping centers.47 The Court distinguished Logan Valley as limited
to a labor dispute and refused to apply its rationale when the
speech activity was not directly related to one of the tenants of the
picketed shopping center and when other "reasonable opportuni-
48ties" existed for the protestors to convey their message. As a
federal question, the issue of free speech protection in shopping
centers was finally resolved in Hudgens v. NLRB," in which the
Court clarified any confusion generated by Lloyd: "[I]f it was not
clear before [,] ... the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the
Court's decision in the Lloyd case., 5° Since Hudgens, the First
Amendment has offered no protection for expressional activities
in shopping malls. However, the "public function" rationale of
Marsh has never been explicitly overruled.
In 1979, the California Supreme Court held in Robins v. Prune-
yard Shopping Cente' that the California Constitution required mall
owners to allow petitioning for signatures on mall property.52 In
Robins, a group of high school students opposed to a U.N. Resolu-
tion against Zionism set up a table and attempted to solicit support
for their cause. 53 The California court reached its conclusion by
focusing on the free speech and petition clauses of the California
Constitution and interpreted those provisions to afford more ex-
pansive protection than the U.S. Constitution.4 In response to the
mall owners' claim that their constitutionally protected property
44. Id. at 506. The Court reasoned further that citizens "must make decisions which
affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed.
In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored."
Id. at 508.
45. See Friedelbaum, supra note 32, at 1230.
46. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
47. Id. at 563-64.
48. Id.
49. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
50. Id. at 518; see also Friedelbaum, supra note 32, at 1232 ("The Supreme Court's find-
ings incontestably favored private property rights regardless of claims that other interests
were germane and were worthy of serious consideration.").
51. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
52. Id. at 346-48.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 346-47.
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rights would be violated if the law required them to permit free
speech on mall property, the California court stated simply: "[A] 11
private property is held subject to the power of the government to
regulate its use for the public welfare."55 In effect, the California
court balanced free speech rights with private property rights and
found that the provisions of the state constitution did reach some
private action. The court held that the free speech and petition
provisions of the California Constitution grant mall visitors a con-
stitutional right to free speech that outweighs the private property
56interests of mall owners.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
state court's decision, noting that its own reasoning in Lloyd "does
not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its
police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution.,57 Essentially, "Pruneyard was an open invita-
tion from the U.S. Supreme Court to the states-both as a matter
of general principle and with respect to speech and assembly spe-
cifically-to address state constitutional issues."5 In the process,
the Court extended an express invitation to state courts to inter-
pret the free speech provisions within their state constitutions
more broadly than the First Amendment by granting protection of
speech in shopping malls.59
55. Id. at 344 (quoting Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d 687, 694
(Cal. 1976)); see also CurtisJ. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 651-52 (1991) ("[A] state's interest in promoting political expression
in... public places may ... override the values associated with private ownership.").
56. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347 ("We conclude that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the Cali-
fornia Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping
centers even when the centers are privately owned.").
57. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (emphasis added).
58. Brady C. Williamson & James A. Friedman, State Constitutions: The Shopping Mall
Cases, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 883,886 (stating further that "the invitation has had few RSVPs").
59. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81 (1980). In upholding the independent state constitu-
tional grounds of Pruneyard, the Court was careful to reaffirm Lloyd: "Lloyd held that when a
shopping center owner opens his private property to the public for the purpose of shop-
ping, the First Amendment... does not thereby create individual rights in expression
beyond those already existing under applicable law." Id.
[VOL. 33:4
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III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR ALLOWING
FREE EXPRESSION IN SHOPPING MALLS
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court weighed in on the ques-
tion,60 the majority of the twenty-one state courts that had
considered the issue of free speech rights after Pruneyard, includ-
ing Arizona,6' Connecticut,6" Georgia,3 Hawaii,64 Iowa,65 Michigan,66
New York,67 North Carolina,68 Ohio, 69 South Carolina,70 Texas,7' and
Wisconsin,72 had "declined Chief Justice Rehnquist's express invita-
tion in Pruneyard' to adopt free speech rights more expansive than
those afforded by the First Amendment.73 These states have chosen
neither to read their free speech provisions as affirmative rights
that can be asserted against both public and private entities nor to
adopt a more flexible state action doctrine.4 These states have
60. See State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1999).
61. Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723-24 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1998).
62. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Conn. 1984).
63. Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga.
1990).
64. Estes v. Kapiolani Women's and Children's Med. Ctr., 787 P.2d 216, 220-21 (Haw.
1990).
65. State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1991).
66. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 347-48 (Mich. 1985).
67. Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (N.Y. 1985).
68. State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981).
69. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ohio 1994).
70. CharlestonJoint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 548 (S.C. 1992).
71. Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex. 1997).
72. Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wis. 1987).
73. SeeWilliamson & Friedman, supra note 58, at 894.
74. See, e.g., Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723-24 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1998); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Conn. 1984) (stating
that the court was "not persuaded that [the] variations in phraseology are sufficient to indi-
cate an intention to allow those rights to be exercised upon every property affording a
suitable opportunity for their enjoyment against the objections of the [private] owners.");
Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga.
1990) (rejecting argument that shopping malls are the functional equivalent of public fo-
rums); Estes v. Kapiolani Women's and Children's Med. Ctr., 787 P.2d 216, 219 (Haw.
1990) (holding that free speech provision "erects no shield against merely private conduct")
(quoting Shelley y. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)); State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 540
(Iowa 1991) (opining that there is a "proper time and place" for even peaceful protests);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 NW.2d 337, 348 (Mich. 1985) (holding that
state's free speech protection is "implicitly limited to... state action"); Shad Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (N.Y. 1985) (rejecting the argument that no state
action requirement exists or should exist under the New York constitution); State v. Felmet,
273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981) (holding that the literal language of free speech provision
makes no affirmative declaration and does not address private action); Eastwood Mall, 626
N.E.2d at 61 (finding an implied state action requirement and holding that "the free speech
guarantees accorded by the Ohio Constitution are no broader than the First Amendment);
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"reached that conclusion either because of the literal language of
the state constitution or, despite that language, based on the ex-
clusive application of the state action to the free speech
provision. 75 In short, these states have chosen not to interpret
their free speech provisions as granting broader protection than
the First Amendment.
7 6
The most recent RSVP, to the invitation in Pruneyard came
78from Minnesota. In State v. Wicklund, the issue of whether visitors
to the Mall of America are protected by the free speech provision
of the Minnesota Constitution came before the Minnesota Su-
preme Court. 9 In Wicklund, the Minnesota Supreme Court joined
the majority of courts considering the issue in holding that mall
visitors are no more protected under the state constitution than
McPherson, 417 S.E.2d at 547 (rejecting argument that shopping centers are the functional
equivalent of public forums); Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 90-91 (finding original intent on the part
of the framers of the Texas constitution to provide for a state action requirement); Jacobs,
407 N.W.2d at 841 (refusing to "legislate" and holding that the state's free speech protec-
tions are limited to state action).
75. Williamson & Friedman, supra note 58, at 894 (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723,
736 (1991)) ("Most state courts have held that their constitutional free speech provisions,
like the First Amendment, govern state action only and do not proscribe the conduct of
private parties who limit free expression on their own property."). Although there is no
definitive articulation of what has come to be known as the "state action doctrine," the first
clear application of the doctrine came in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in
which the Supreme Court held that civil rights amendments do not apply to limit the con-
duct of private actors. Id. at 25. In other words, "[t]he state action doctrine requires that in
order for the Constitution to protect the rights of individuals, it must do so against some
sort of encroachment by the state." Alexander, supra note 9, at 23. Thus, "[s]ome finding of
'state action' is necessary before challenged conduct can be considered the conduct of the
state." Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriti-
cized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REv. 327, 330 (1990).
Despite the simplicity of the above explanations, the state action doctrine is subject to a
wide variety of interpretations, resulting in a "conceptual disaster area." Alexander, supra
note 9, at 23 (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and Cali-
fornia's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 91 (1967)). Academics have made numerous
efforts to "make sense of the doctrine and refine or otherwise consolidate the meaning of
state action." Id. at 106 n.129. Despite the criticism and uncertainty, many state courts have
adopted the doctrine wholesale, applying it to limit the reach of state constitutional protec-
tions. See Cole, supra, at 329. Further, some state courts have chosen "to incorporate the
federal constitutional concept of state action into their state constitutions even though the
framers of the state constitutions apparently deliberately stated the right of free expression
in broader language than the First Amendment." Abrahamson, supra, at 736. Abrahamson
also notes that "[f]orty-three states have constitutional provisions linguistically similar to the
California constitution." Id. at 735.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. See Williamson & Friedman, supra note 58, at 886 (referring to each state's consid-
eration of the issue as an "RSVP").
78. 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
79. Id. at 799.
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under the First Amendment. ° Thus, in Minnesota, mall visitors
cannot assert free speech rights against mall owners because mall
owners are private actors.
In reaching this conclusion, Minnesota has become the newest
member of what could be termed the United Mall of America, a
loose federation of states willing to subordinate public citizenship
to the allegedly inflexible rights claimed by private property own-
ers. This continued subordination of public discourse to private
ownership--in the face of obvious changes in our cultural land-
scape-merely allows the further obliteration of any arena for
"public citizenship."81 As each state joins the United Mall, the al-
ready bloated influence that the values of consumerism exert over
our lives grows even larger.
Not all state courts have declined Pruneyards invitation. In Bock
v. Westminster Mall Co., 83 the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the Colorado Constitution protected political leafletting in a large
shopping mall. 4 In Bock, a group calling itself the "Pledge of Resis-
tance" asked permission from Westminster Mall "to distribute
political pamphlets and to solicit signatures pledging non-violent
dissent from the federal government's foreign policy toward Cen-
tral America."85 The mall argued simply that the constitution
required state action and that, because the mall was privately
owned, the mall could freely deny the permission requested. 6 The
court declined to confront the issue of whether state action is a
prerequisite in Colorado for invoking constitutional protection. 7
80. Id.
81. By "public citizenship," I mean physical participation--ithin a public arena-in
political, social, and community discourse. Other terms that would capture this ideal are
"public debate," "participatory democracy," "public discourse," "public conversation," or
"political action." The notion of an active citizenry in the public sphere is classical in origin
and has been the subject of extensive academic discourse. Although I do not intend to ad-
dress so vast a topic in this Note, by using the term "public citizenship" I cannot avoid
invoking its long history. For a recent comprehensive analysis of First Amendmentjurispru-
dence and the concept of public participation in politics and community, see Failinger,
supra note 34, at 255-64. See also Allen, supra note 34, at 93 (discussing the theories ofJCirgen
Habermas and Hannah Arendt in the context of Supreme Courtjurisprudence).
82. Writing about growth of leisure complexes where "tourism, entertainment, and re-
tail development are ... bundled together in a 'themed' environment," John Hannigan
comments that "[i]n these new leisure spaces, citizenship becomes equated with brand-
name consumption, and the dream of a lively and creative public culture is crowded out by
pre-packaged corporate entertainment." Hannigan, supra note 26, at 7. Hannigan also that
"this new urbanism of leisure will further encourage the privatisation of public spaces and
the erosion of neighbourhood identities." Id. (citing critic Paul Goldberger).
83. 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991).
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id. at 60.
87. Id. at 60 n.7.
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Instead, the court acknowledged Pruneyard's invitation to interpret
the free-speech provision of the Colorado Constitution as confer-
ring broader rights than the First Amendment s8 and further
recognized that the free speech provision of the Colorado Consti-
tution extended "beyond the negative command of its first clause
to make an affirmative declaration in the second clause."'8 9 But, ul-
timately, the court decided to examine the issue under the public
forum doctrine, 9° viewing the mall as so entangled with the gov-
ernment that there was, in effect, sufficient state action to trigger
the protection of Colorado's free speech provision. 9
While the court did not expressly deny a state action require-
ment, the court criticized the mall's exclusive reliance on the state
action doctrine, stating that "[t]he facts of the case here ... belie
this simplistic division of the universe into public and private
spheres."92 The court noted the mall's large size and close relation-
ship with the municipality it served. The mall was located across
the street from city hall.94 It covered 100 acres and offered more
than 100,000 square feet of common area.9 At times, ten percent
of the city's retail sales were generated by the mall.96 City police
officers also patrolled the mall, and the mall permitted the city to
maintain a police substation and holding facilities on the prop-
erty.97 The court found particularly persuasive the fact that the city
financed improvements that the mall made to adjacent roads. 9s
The mall had a history of allowing various groups to use its com-
mon areas for demonstrations, of allowing branches of the Armed
88. Id. at 58.
89. Id. The second clause of Article I, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution pro-
vides that "every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any
subject ... ." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10, cl. 2.
90. Under this doctrine, public forums are those places, such as streets and sidewalks,
which are owned by the government and traditionally open to expressive activities. Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1974). The public forum doctrine is the result of the court's
.attempt to preserve some public space for speech." Failinger, supra note 34, at 272. Parks,
streets, and sidewalks have emerged as the "'quintessential public forums', by a long tradi-
tion devoted to assembly and debate, where content regulations are judged by strict
scrutiny, and time, place and manner restrictions by a four-part test." Id. at 272 n.120 (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); see also JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1142-43 (5th ed. 1995) (describing
the Court's time, place, and manner doctrine in the context of the public forum doctrine).
91. Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 (Colo. 1991).
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id. at 62.
94. Id. at 57.
95. Id. at 62.
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id. at 61.
98. Id.
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Forces to display equipment and pass out literature, and of allow-
ing community bazaars, art and dance shows, and solicitation by
Boy and Girl Scouts.99 The court found not only that the level of
government involvement was sufficient to activate the free speech
protections of the Colorado Constitution, but also that the mall
effectively functioned as a public place. 00
Considering all the facts and circumstances underlying the
Mall's operation with the preferred liberty of speech in mind,
we conclude that there was governmental involvement in this
case, most assuredly triggering the protections of Article II,
section 10. Respondent's denial of petitioners' rights to dis-
tribute political pamphlets and to solicit pledge signatures in
the common areas of the Mall therefore violated that provi-
sion of the Colorado Constitution.
Because we hold, on the facts of this case, that governmental
involvement exists and that the open and public areas of the
Mall effectively function as a public place, we leave for an-
other day the issue as to whether some lesser form or degree
of governmental involvement is a prerequisite to successfully
pleading the protections of Article II, Section 10.101
In the instance of Westminster Mall, the court "recognized ...
that the mall has replaced, or at least supplemented, the town hall




Oregon has also accepted Pruneyard's invitation, although it did
so initially without relying on the free speech provision of the
Oregon Constitution. In 1,993, the Oregon Supreme Court held in
Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen'03 that persons seeking signatures for ballot
initiatives have a right to use the mall's common areas.1 0 4 Rather
than basing its holding on the free speech provision of the state's
constitution, °5 the court turned to Article IV, section 1 of the
99. Id. at 57.
100. Id. at 62.
101. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
102. Williamson & Friedman, supra note 58, at 889 n.34 (citingJohn Michael Vazquez,
Case Note, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 389, 389-90 (1995)) ("American society... has
changed in recent decades such that urban downtown business districts, areas once effec-
tively utilized as public forums, are now being replaced by suburban shopping malls as the
center of social interaction between members of the community.").
103. 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993).
104. Id. at 456.
105. Unlike the free speech provisions in many state constitutions, and like the First
Amendment, Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution makes no affirmative declara-
tion: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the
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Oregon Constitution, which reserves initiative and referendum
powers to the citizens.
10 6
[W] e hold that to prohibit the gathering of signatures on ini-
tiative petitions in the common areas of large shopping
centers such as the Lloyd Center would "impinge on constitu-
tional rights" conferred on the citizens of this state by the
provisions of Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitu-
tion. Such rights, however, are subject to reasonable time,
107place, and manner restrictions ....
The court's rationale was drawn from Marsh v. Alabama,0 8 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[t]he more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it."' 09 The Oregon
court further described the initiative process as "one of our soci-
ety's most precious rights" and found that the collection of
signatures would be substantially impaired if not permitted to be
conducted in large shopping malls."
To date, the New Jersey Supreme Court has provided the most
extensive and clearly articulated model for rejecting the traditional
state action requirement by holding mall owners accountable for
violations of the state's free speech protections. In 1994, the New
Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the free speech provision of the
NewJersey Constitution." as extending to private owners of shop-
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be re-
sponsible for the abuse of this right." OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
106. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
107. Lloyd, 849 P.2d at 453.
108. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
109. Id. at 506.
We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the question. The
State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chicka-
saw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his
guests. We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion.
Id. at 505-06 (footnote omitted).
110. Lloyd, 849 P.2d at 453; see also State v. Dameron, 853 P.2d 1285, 1293 (Or.
1993) (finding that there is a state constitutional right to gather petition signatures on pri-
vate property). The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a similar result in Batchelder v.
Allied Stores International, 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983), narrowly holding that citizens have
the right to solicit signatures on mall property for the limited purpose of ballot access. Id. at
591 (basing its holding not on free speech provisions, but on the right to free elections).
111. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sen-
timents on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.").
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ping malls as well as state action in New Jersey Coalition Against War
in the Middle East v. JM.B. Realty Corp."2 Fifteen years earlier, the
court had set forth a standard in State v. Schmid1 3 that essentially
balanced expressional rights and property rights in the context of
free speech on property owned by a private university. The court
in New Jersey Coalition based its decision upon the rationale of
Schmid and considered in its analysis the three Schmid factors:
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such pri-
vate property, generally, its "normal" use,
(2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to
use that property, and
(3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon such property in relation to both the private
and public use of the property. This is a multi-
faceted test which must be applied to ascertain
whether in a given case owners of private property
may be required to permit, subject to suitable re-
strictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of
the constitutional freedoms of speech and assem-
bly.1
1 4
Applying the Schmid test, the court found that the owners of re-
gional malls were constitutionally obligated to permit "leafletting
and associate [sic] speech in support of, or in opposition to,
causes, candidates, and parties-political and societal free
speech."'
The court noted the reasoning of Logan Valley and the dissent-
ing opinions in Lloyd and Hudgens as it returned to the principles
recognized in Marsh:
The principle of that case (and Logan) is that the constitu-
tional right of free speech cannot be determined by title to
property alone. Thus, where private ownership of property
that is the functional counterpart of the downtown business
district has effectively monopolized significant opportunities
112. 650A.2d 757, 779 (N.J. 1994).
113. 423 A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980).
114. NewJersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 771 (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630).
115. Id. at 781. In their commentary on the various states' treatment of free speech in
shopping malls, Williamson and Friedman noted that "[g]iven the potentially broad and
generic definition of 'cause,' this decision may be the high-water mark for state constitu-
tional protection of speech and assembly on private property." Williamson & Friedman,
supra note 58, at 888.
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for free speech, the owners cannot eradicate those opportuni-
ties by prohibiting it.'16
The court also gave some weight to the language of its free
speech provision, which it characterized as conferring "an affirma-
tive right of free speech""' 7 that "neither government nor private
entities can unreasonably restrict.""" In what sounds much like an
"estoppel theory,"" 9 the New Jersey court reasoned that because
the mall owners "have intentionally transformed their property
into a public square or market, a public gathering place, a down-
town business district, a community,"' 20 they cannot later deny
their own implied invitation to use the space as it was clearly in-
tended. 2' According to the court, mall owners have "taken that old
downtown away from its former home and moved all of it, except
free speech, to the suburbs.' '2 2 The court reasoned that the mall
owners cannot appropriate a traditional public forum without also
recognizing "a constitutional responsibility" to allow free expres-
sion to follow the public forum.
2 3
As in Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply a
narrow state action requirement and found that its free speech
provision protected its citizens not only from governmental re-
116. New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 777. The court also noted Justice Marshall's dis-
senting opinion in Hudgen.
[T]here is nothing in Marsh to suggest that its general approach was limited to the
particular facts of that case. The underlying concern in Marsh was that traditional
public channels of communication remain free, regardless of the incidence of own-
ership. Given that concern, the crucial fact in Marsh was that the company owned the
traditional forums essential for effective communication....
In Logan Valley we recognized what the Court today refuses to recognize-that the
owner of the modern shopping center complex, by dedicating his property to public
use as a business district, to some extent displaces the "State" from control of histori-
cal First Amendment forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of places suitable
for effective communication.
Id. at 777 n.12 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 539 (1976)).
117. New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 779.
118. Id.
119. Harriet Dinegar Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private
Shopping Center's Prohibition or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity, 52
A.L.R.5th 195, 210-11 (1997) (noting that the court used its "own 'estoppel' theory that
mall owners who have purposely transformed the life of society for their own profit 'should
not be permitted to claim a theoretically-important right of silence from the multitudes
they have invited'").
120. New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 776.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 774.
123. Id. at 777.
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straint, but also from the "restraint of private property owners.' 24
The court engaged in a balancing of interests and did not find
the right of free expression more important than the rights of
property owners. Rather, the court found that the rights of prop-
erty owners would not be unreasonably infringed by allowing
free expression, while disallowing free expression would be a
"massive" infringement on citizens' freedoms. 2 5
IV. MINNESOTA: THE MALL OF AMERICA
Against this backdrop, the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of free speech protections in shopping malls as
grounded in the Minnesota Constitution. On the one hand, the
conservative decisions of the majority of state courts wielded an
advantage through sheer persuasive bulk; on the other, the radical
departures of the New Jersey, California, Colorado, Massachusetts,
and Oregon courts offered thoughtful alternatives to tradition.
2 6
Added to the mix was the fact that the Mall of America is itself a
cultural icon whose significance extends-due to both conscious
design and the mysteries of popular attraction-beyond a mere
124. Id. at 760.
125. Id. at 779. For a thorough discussion of the shopping mall cases generally and, in
particular, the decision in New Jersey Coalition, see Friedelbaum, supra note 32. While
Friedelbaum acknowledges that "[a] resort to independent state grounds represents the
only viable alternative to effectuate the libertarian goals sought to be achieved," id. at 1243,
he ultimately concludes:
Shopping malls, notwithstanding their peculiar attributes and the challenges that
they present to traditional values, cannot be equated with conventional public fora.
This is so no matter how adroit the arguments set forth by judicial proponents who
maintain unflinchingly that the centers are obligated to meet the needs of a changed
society and to reflect revised community visages.
Id. at 1260. Noting that private property rights "remain firmly embedded in the American
constitutional fabric," Friedelbaum rejects the reasoning of decisions like New Jersey Coalition
in which economic freedom is "selectively downgraded toward the achievement of ideologi-
cal objectives currently in vogue." Id. at 1262. Friedelbaum's conclusion, which is based
upon the preeminence of property rights, represents the position most often used to deflect
challenges to the state action requirement in the context of shopping malls. But see Berger,
supra note 55, at 635 (suggesting that the "gospel of private ownership" should be subject to
balancing against free speech interests). Berger notes that "in setting the fulcrum between
speech and property, both state and federal courts have given far greater leverage to prop-
erty than any sensible weighing of the competing interests dictates." Id. at 636 (footnotes
omitted).
126. By referring to these decisions as "thoughtful," I mean that they "recognize the
centrality of the mall in society, and their case law protects some speech rights in shopping
malls." Alexander, supra note 9, at 31.
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conglomeration of retail establishments. It is the Mall of America, a
name that signifies a destination that is at once self-consciously
grand at a national level and simply a description of the preemi-
nent American leisure activity-shopping.
Measuring 4.2 million square feet, the Mall of America (the Mall),
located in Bloomington, Minnesota, is the ultimate shopping mall.
The largest shopping mall in the United States, the Mall is a major
Minnesota tourist attraction, drawing 37.5 million visitors a year.1
7
The Mall houses the nation's largest indoor amusement park,
Camp Snoopy, a 1.2 million-gallon walk-through aquarium, and
the World's Largest Pop Tab Collection. 128The Mall has hosted the
World's Largest Marriage Workshop and the World's Largest Slee-
pover, as well as a reception for the President of Botswana.129 In
addition, the Mall is home to a public school, the Metropolitan
Learning Alliance, and a branch of a private university, the Univer-
sity of St. Thomas.1 3 0 The Mall of America maintains a "WCCO
Community Booth" for sharing of community events and views.'
The League of Women voters registers people to vote at the Mall;
the Red Cross held a walk-a-thon at the Mall; and the Children's
Home Society passes out literature at the community booth.1 32 The
City of Bloomington operates a police substation at the mall,
which also happens to be the only police substation in the city.
33
Under a special contract, Bloomington police officers work hun-
dreds of hours at the Mall and are considered on-duty under the
supervision of the city police department.3 4 The Mall compensates
the City for the services of the police officers at a rate of time-and-
a-half plus a sixteen percent administrative fee.
Substantial public funds were involved in the construction of the
Mall. The Bloomington Port Authority issued approximately $105
million in tax increment financing bonds to be repaid with recap-
tured tax dollars generated by the Mall. 36 These funds "financed
the site preparation including utilities, parking ramps, access roads






132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id.
136. State v. Wicklund, No. C7-97-1381, 1997 WL 426209, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July
24, 1997).
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between [the Mall] and the ramps, and pedestrian bridges linking
the ramps to the [M]all itself.
13 7
In addition to the tax increment financing, the Minnesota legis-
lature passed a special law "giving the City of Bloomington
permission to issue eighty million dollars in bond financing to
cover the cost of highway reconstruction surrounding the [Mall] in
time for its opening.",3 These amounts together, $186 million,
represented twenty-one percent of the total expenditures for the
Mall's construction;1 3 9 the rest, approximately $700 million, came
from privately owned corporations.
14
0
The public areas of the Mall are represented as "city streets" and
a "town square. ',1 1 The Mall is "promoted as being more than
Disney World, the Grand Canyon and Graceland combined.' ' 42 In-
deed, the promoters of the mall describe the project proudly as a
"city within a city.' ' 43
On Sunday, May 19, 1996, a small group of anti-fur protestors
positioned themselves inside the Mall of America, adjacent to the
entrance to Macy's1 44 Without first seeking permission from the
Mall, the protestors held placards and distributed leaflets express-
ing opposition to the cruel treatment of animals in the fur industry
and "urging a boycott of Macy's.",4 5 They also attempted to engage
passersby in discussions "about the ethics of producing and selling
fur products." 46 After repeated warnings, Mall security officers ar-
rested the protestors and charged them with misdemeanor
trespass.1
4 7
Initially, the protestors moved to dismiss the trespass charges
based upon a "claim of right" under the First Amendment, but "at
the suggestion of the trial court,"14 they changed their focus to the
Minnesota Constitution, which provides that "all persons may
137. State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1999).
138. Id. at 795-96 (footnote omitted).
139. Brief for Appellants at 8, State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999) (No.
C7-97-1381).
140. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 795-96.
141. Brief for Appellants at 12 n.6, Wicklund (No. C7-97-1381) (citing Order on Mo-
tion to Dismiss, State's App. at 238-39).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 5, Wicklund (No. C7-
97-1381). Some of the Mall of America's promotional literature reads: "[The] Mall of
America will be a city within a city, unlike other malls .... It will be divided into four dis-
tinctive city streets providing four unique shopping and visual environments." Id. at 5-6.
144. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 795.
145. Id.




University of Michigan Journal of Law Refonn[
freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all subjects, be-
ing responsible for an abuse of such right., 149 The trial court,
having first wisely framed the issue as one of state constitutional
dimensions under Pruneyard, was faced with a prior decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in which the court stated that Minne-
sota's free speech protection is "no more extensive in this case
than the protection provided by the [F]irst [A]mendment.' ' 15 0 Un-
daunted, the trial court declared the statement to be no more than
"hideous dictum." 15' According to the trial court, that statement,
which was made in the limited context of the regulation of com-
mercial speech, was not binding authority that would foreclose the
extension of free speech protections in other contexts.
5 2
Accordingly, the trial court proceeded to interpret the state
constitution as protecting speech in shopping malls and held that
the Mall was the functional equivalent of public property. As a
result, the Mall could only impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions.14 The trial court reached this conclusion in
part because of the public subsidy of the project and the general
invitation to the public to enter the Mall. The primary reason for
the trial court's conclusion, however, was that the Mall is "as public
as any city thoroughfare, as any government grounds"1 56 and that it
was "born of a union with government." 157 Despite this conclusion,
149. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
150. State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) ("The pro-
tection of freedom of speech guaranteed by the Minn. Constitution... is no more extensive
in this case than the protection provided by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the United States
Constitution.") (emphasis added).
151. State v. Wicklund, No. C7-97-1381, 1997 WL 426209, at *15 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July
24, 1997).
152. Id. at*15-18.
153. Id. at *24.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *22. Considering the question of whether there is any threshold to the level
of public subsidy that would trigger state action,Judge Nordby wrote:
It [sic] there is a threshold, it is far, far below the public involvement here, where we
are confronted not with hundreds or thousands or even modest millions of dollars,
but more than a hundred million. There can perhaps be no bright line; at least it
need not be drawn here; for if language means anything, if we have not entirely lost
our ability to conceive perspective, if we have not bartered our common sense for
the right to manipulate words with absolute artificiality, a public investment of this
magnitude (to which the enterprise owes its very existence) simply cannot be said ra-
tionally to be "private". And Constitutional rights can hardly be proportional to the
degree of public versus private investment.
Id. at *20 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at*23.
157. Id. The trial court made extensive findings of fact. Finding 18 is as follows:
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the trial court denied the protestors' motion to dismiss because
the protestors had failed to "test the Mall's willingness to honor
the Constitution"'58 by asking permission before staging the pro-
test. 
159
The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the trial court's de-
cision as one that appeared to dispense cavalierly with the
traditional "state action" requirement for triggering Minnesota's
constitutional protections.16 The court of appeals based its deci-
sion on the lack of support for the trial court's conclusion that the
framers of the Minnesota Constitution intended the state's free
speech provision to provide more protection than its federal coun-
terpart, and, additionally, on its own historical reluctance to
interpret Article I, section 3 of the state's constitution more expan-
sively than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
1 6
According to the court of appeals, "[i]f the 'state action' require-
ment is discarded, it is difficult to formulate a principled line
between those privately-owned locations in which constitutional
free speech guarantees should apply and those where they should
not."'62 The court of appeals also noted that the language of the
free speech provision of the Minnesota Constitution, while
"express[ing] the right of free speech in positive terms," is never-
theless "not unique.' '1 3 The court of appeals concluded that "the
public funding involved in the development of the Mall of Amer-
ica does not satisfy the state action requirement" 164 as established
under Minnesota law.
Large shopping malls are a phenomenon of concern to some architects and urban
planners. By enclosing many businesses and activities traditionally found on open
public streets within largely featureless and sometimes fortress-like exterior walls, the
structures displace people who would otherwise shop, entertain themselves, exercise,
and exchange ideas on city streets, in public parks or in the town square.
Id. at *3 (citing testimony of Professors Thomas Fisher and Judith Martin, professors of
architecture at the University of Minnesota School of Architecture) (footnote omitted).
158. Id. at *25.
159. Id.
160. State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Minn. App. 1998) (declaring that the
"'state action' requirement is a necessary restriction on the powers of the courts under the
separation of powers doctrine").
161. Id. at 759.
162. Id. at 758.
163. Id. at 756.
164. Id. at 757 (citing Brennan v. Minneapolis Soc'y for the Blind, Inc., 282 N.W.2d
515, 527-28 (Minn. 1979) (holding that more is required for "state action" than public
funding)).
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In State v. Wicklund, 165 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the free speech protections of the Minnesota Constitution do not,
in any context, afford more extensive protection of speech than
the First Amendment.1 66 The court further held that neither the
public access to the Mall of America nor the public financing in-
volved transformed the Mall into public property for purposes of
free speech protection.
167
In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that it "may ar-
ticulate independent and more protective standards under [the]
state constitution than are accorded under comparable provisions
of the Federal Constitution."'6 It declined to do so in the context
of shopping malls, however, stating simply that "[t]he Minnesota
Constitution does not accord affirmative rights to citizens against
each other; its provisions are triggered only by state action."6 9 The
court further noted that it had previously defined in Brennan v.
Minneapolis Society for the Blind, Inc. what constitutes "state action"
in the context of the federal constitution: "' [I]f the conduct that is
formally private has become so entwined with governmental char-
acter as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action,' federal constitutional restrictions on conduct
may be applied against private entities.' 71 In Brennan, the court
made clear that, for such entanglement to exist, "[t]he facts al-
leged to constitute a symbiosis must indeed convince us that the
'power, property, and prestige' of the state has been in fact placed
behind the discriminatory conduct.", 72 In Wicklund, the court
stated that the "lack of evidence connecting the 'power, property
and prestige' of the State of Minnesota or the City of Bloomington
with the actions of [the Mall] management compellingly persuades
us that there is neither sufficient nexus nor symbiosis to establish
that [the Mall] is the alter ego of a governmental entity."
173
The Minnesota Supreme Court took great pains to distinguish
the circumstances presented from those of the decisions in Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Oregon, and NewJersey. For example, the court
165. 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
166. Id. at 803.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 798 (citing decisions upholding more protection in the context of due proc-
ess, search and seizure standards, religious freedom, and equal protection analysis).
169. Id. at 801 (citing State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton, 65 N.W. 262, 263 (Minn. 1895)).
170. 282 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1979).
171. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting Brennan v. Minneapolis Soc'y for the Blind,
Inc., 282 N.W.2d 515,524 (Minn. 1979)).
172. 282 N.W.2d at 528 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
725 (1961)).
173. 589 N.W.2d at 802.
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distinguished Pruneyard by noting that "California bases its protec-
tion of speech inside privately owned shopping malls on two state
constitutional provisions-the right to free speech and the right to
petition.'' There is no similar right to petition under the Minne-
sota constitution. 175 In making this summary distinction, the court
failed to acknowledge the express balancing of constitutionally
protected interests engaged in by the California Supreme Court,
176
a balancing that focused on the quality of the rights at stake, not
their quantity.
The court distinguished the decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court in Bock v. Westminster Mall Co. 77 on the grounds that the gov-
ernmental involvement in Bock was "far more of a governmental
nature" 178 than the governmental involvement in the Mall of Amer-
ica. Further, the court "simply disagree[d] that the circumstance
[in Bock] would, under the Minnesota Constitution, rise to the
level that the power, property and prestige of the state would im-
plicate the state as the responsible actor."'179 Setting aside the fact
that the descriptions of government involvement in Westminster
Mall and the Mall of America are hardly "far" different,"s° the Min-
nesota court failed to explain why the question would come out
differently under the Minnesota Constitution. In fact, not only is
Minnesota's free speech provision virtually identical to Califor-
nia's"l-and thus arguably a purely affirmative right to free
speech-but it also lacks a "negative clause" similar to the first
clause of Colorado's free speech provision.
2
The court in Wicklund only briefly noted the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, viewing it as
merely granting the right of "state constitutional protection to per-
sons seeking signatures on initiative petitions in common areas of
174. Id. at 801 (citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979),
affd447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
175. Id.
176. Robins, 592 P.2d at 346-48.
177. 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991).
178. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 802 n.8.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 91-102. The development of both Westminster
Mall and the Mall of America involved public financing. In addition, both housed police
substations and hosted similar community activities.
181. The California Constitution provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a). Com-
pare id. with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
182. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3 with COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10, cl. 1.
183. 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993).
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large shopping centers. ", 84 The court found this limited right to be
inapplicable to the case at hand, and, in the process, brushed over
the Oregon court's balancing of one right expressly protected by
the state constitution-the right to collect signatures--against the
property interests of the mall owners. 185 It is, however, precisely this
balancing, as drawn from Marsh v. Alabama, 1 6 that makes Lloyd sig-
nificant; if nothing else, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged
that, in some circumstances, rights granted under a state constitu-
tion can outweigh private property interests regardless of whether
state action is present. This acknowledgement, although not neces-
sarily authoritative with respect to the interpretation of the
Minnesota Constitution, deserves, at the very least, attention and
analysis. The Minnesota Supreme Court engaged in neither.
Finally, the court summarily dismissed the persuasive force of
New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. JM.B. Realty
Corp.187 by noting that the "[p]rotection extended under the New
Jersey constitution is limited to 'leafletting and associate [sic]
speech in support of, or in opposition to causes, candidates, and
parties.' ,,88 The court's treatment of New Jersey Coalition was notable
in light of the "estoppel" theory espoused by the New Jersey court.
Invoking the estoppel theory, the appellants in Wicklund had not
only produced promotional materials and design aspects of the
Mall as evidence of an intent to replicate a town hall, but had also
offered the expert testimony of architecture professors at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota.189 Professor Thomas Fisher, Dean of the
School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, testified that
malls are "'simulation [s] of traditional towns'" and "'have become
the one place where there is healthy commerce going on.""90 Pro-
fessor Fisher also noted an ironic inversion of architectural
referents: "There has been an invasion of the town square model
prototype, in which the mall has become the type for the down-
town rather than the downtown being the prototype for the
mall."'8 ' Professor Judith Martin, Director of the Department of
Urban Studies at the University of Minnesota, testified that subur-
ban communities do not take pains to create public space,
184. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801.
185. See id.
186. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
187. 650 A.2d 757, 781 (1994).
188. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 781).
189. Brief for Appellants at 9, State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1999) (No.
C7-97-1381).
190. Record at 43, State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1999) (No. C7-97-1381).
191. Record at 57, Wicklund (No. C7-97-1381).
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"'because it's assumed the mall is effectively going to be that.' ,,192
She further testified that "the reduction of public space 'reduces
levels of civility overall for everyone.' 093
By including the testimony of experts in architecture and ur-
ban studies and by pointing to the Mall's promotional materials
that boast of the Mall as a wondrous tourist attraction and "a city
within a city,' 94 the appellants were clearly attempting to per-
suade the court of the applicability of an estoppel theory like that
in New Jersey Coalition.15 However, the court either failed or refused
to acknowledge that the limited protection extended under the
New Jersey Constitution would apply perfectly to the conduct of
the anti-fur protestors at the Mall of America. The protesters were
clearly engaged in "leafletting and associate [sic] speech in sup-
port of, or in opposition to [a] cause[]";' 96 they supported a
boycott of Macy's and opposed the cruel treatment of animals by
the fur trade-both being obvious "causes.' ' 97 Again, the court in
Wicklund failed to adequately consider the reasoning of New Jersey
Coalition, which suggests that the rights of property owners are sub-
ject to balancing regardless of a traditional state action
requirement.
While the Minnesota Supreme Court is certainly under no obli-
gation to follow the reasoning of other state courts in interpreting
the Minnesota Constitution, the court's mechanical elimination of
their reasoning was striking nonetheless. By systematically dimin-
ishing the persuasive authority of the decisions from California,
Colorado, Oregon, and New Jersey, the court was left with no
choice but to follow the "logic" of the courts in states having de-
clined the Pruneyard invitation. In doing so, Minnesota has helped
to enlarge the United Mall of America.
192. Record at 86, Wicklund, (No. C7-97-1381).
193. Record at 44, Wicklund, (No. C7-97-1381).
194. Brief for Appellants at 9, Wicklund (No. C7-97-1381).
195. But seeJulian N. Eule &Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537, 1542
(1998) (questioning the "wisdom and constitutionality of imposing the speech norms of the
First Amendment on the private sector"). Further, Eule and Varat use the decision in New
Jersey Coalition to illustrate their point that, however appealing the erosion of public and
private distinctions may be, transporting free speech norms into the private sector is ulti-
mately a curse. Id. at 1570-75. "[Tjhe theory of waiver ... is strained to a dangerous degree
when it is triggered by operating a private business for profit even on so grand a scale as the
large regional shopping center." Id. at 1572.
196. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 781 (N.J. 1994).
197. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801.
SUMMER 2000]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
V. THE MALLING OF CITY HALL: A PREDICTION
AND SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
There is no consistent rationale behind the decisions that
grant free speech protections to the visitors of shopping malls.
The Colorado Supreme Court found sufficient entanglement
with the government to support a finding of state action.9 8 The
Oregon court based its decision on the initiative and referendum
powers reserved to Oregon citizens in the state constitution."'
The California and NewJersey courts balanced the property rights
of mall owners against the free speech protections of the state con-
stitution and held that the right of citizens to engage in free
expression outweighed the property interest of the mall owners.200
Both courts dispensed with the traditional state action require-
ment in that context.20' The New Jersey court also noted the
"affirmative right" granted by the free speech provision of the New
202Jersey Constitution. Interestingly, the language of New Jersey's
free speech provision is nearly identical to that of states in which
the courts have refused to extend free speech protection in shop-
ping malls. °3
Because of the inconsistency in past decisions, it would be
difficult to predict outcomes in states that have not yet addressed
the issue. The one consistent theme is the echo of Marsh v.
204Alabama, either as analogous support for the decision or as a
ground for distinction. In his dissent in New Jersey Coalition, Justice
Garibaldi vigorously denied that shopping malls are "'replica[s] of
the community itself'.... Shopping malls do not have housing,
town halls, libraries, houses of worship, hospitals, or schools. 2 05 In
a commonly stated objection to allowing free speech protections in
shopping malls, Justice Garibaldi maintained that "[t] he
inescapable mission of shopping malls is not to be the successor to
downtown business districts; rather, it is to provide a comfortable
198. Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 (Colo. 1991).
199. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446, 453 (Or. 1993).
200. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 346-47 (Cal. 1979); NewJer-
sey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d 757, 775 (NJ. 1994).
201. Robins, 592 P.2d at 346-47; New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 775.
202. New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 760.
203. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
204. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
205. NewJersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 794 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quoting majority
opinion, 650 A.2d at 774).
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and conducive atmosphere for shopping." °6 But what about
shopping malls that have police stations, schools, housing,
libraries, and churches?20  More pointedly, what about the
Knoxville Center and the city of Knoxville, Tennessee, which
together invite and encourage the public to transact its city and
county related business at the "City Hall at the Mall"?08
As Tennessee law currently stands and considering the mall's
explicit acknowledgment that it houses a city hall, it would be quite
an exercise for the Tennessee Supreme Court to conclude that
Knoxville Center is not a "town hall., 20 9 As a result, a case present-
ing this issue in Tennessee-and factually linked to the City Hall in
the Mall-has an appreciable chance of resulting in a decision
holding that the Tennessee Constitution affords free speech pro-
tection to its mall-citizens. To hold otherwise would allow the
government to avoid an essential element of its public character
206. Id.; see also Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988) (rejecting the claim that shopping malls are the functional equivalent of town
squares and asserting that malls are no more than retail establishments grouped together
for convenience).
207. The Mall of America houses a public school and a private university. Brief for Ap-
pellants at 7, State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999) (No. C7-97-1381).
208. Knoxville Center is wholly owned by the Simon Property Group, Inc. (SPG); the
Mall of America is partly owned by SPG. SPG has an interest in over 200 malls all over the
United States. Simon Property Group, Corporate Info, List of All Simon Properties, available
at http://about.simon.com/locator/proplist.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2001) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
209. While the question facing the Minnesota Supreme Court has not come up in Ten-
nessee, the Tennessee courts have held that, in certain circumstances, the Tennessee
Constitution provides broader rights than the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Jacumin,
778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989) (finding that citizen was entitled to broader protection
against search and seizure under state constitution); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn.
1979) (emphasizing the independence of the state constitution in construing state's ex post
facto clause more broadly than Supreme Court's narrow interpretation); Campbell v. Sund-
quist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (striking down the state's anti-sodomy law by
finding that the right to privacy granted by state constitution is broader than that afforded
by federal constitution). In State v. Black, then-ChiefJustice Reid wrote: "Tennessee constitu-
tional standards are not destined to walk in lock step with the uncertain and fluctuating
federal standards and do not relegate Tennessee citizens to the lowest levels of constitu-
tional protection, those guaranteed by the national constitution." 815 S.W.2d 166, 193
(Tenn. 1991) (Reid, C.J., separate opinion). In addition, the free speech provision of the
Tennessee Constitution is worded, like New Jersey's, as an affirmative right: "The free
communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19. Interestingly, Tennessee adds that the right to free
speech is "one of the invaluable rights of man." Id. Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has never explicitly limited the breadth of the state free speech provision to that of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and has even suggested that the right to free speech
may be broader than the First Amendment. See Leech v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d
738, 745 (Tenn. 1979) ("Tenn. Const. art. I, § 19, should be construed to have a scope at
least as broad as that afforded those freedoms [of speech and press] by the [F]irst
[A]mendment.") (emphasis added).
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merely by becoming the tenant of a private property owner. While
it is not clear that the state intended to "hide out" in the mall the
effect is the same if citizens are prevented entirely from engaging
in public discourse or protest on the mall "streets" in front of the
City Hall at the Mall. As our public space becomes increasingly
characterized by financial arrangements with private owners, such
a result could be seen as the improper elevation of form-property
ownership-over content-the location of civic institutions.
By clinging to the state action doctrine, states that refuse to ex-
tend free speech rights in the context of shopping malls are
involved in the conservative application of "traditional" doc-
trines.210 Further, these states implicitly endorse the notion that
streets and sidewalks provide adequate alternatives for active pub-
lic discourse. In our increasingly suburban culture, however,
streets and sidewalks have become no more than sterile conduits
for anonymous travel from one private space to another, devoid of
public exchanges of civic-minded expression."' In addition, the
U.S. Supreme Court has minimized somewhat the "public" aspect
of sidewalks, further reducing opportunities for public debate
2 1 2
210. For a recent discussion and criticism of state courts' embrace of the federal state
action doctrine, see Cole, supra note 75, at 379 (1990) (noting that a separation of powers
justification for a state action requirement is "less compelling" in a state setting than in the
federal setting). Through the common law, state courts have demonstrated their compe-
tence in ordering private relationships, and to claim that only the legislature can do so is
not justified. See id. Ultimately, Cole concludes that states could justify a state action doc-
trine as a limited separation of powers device through "legislative trumping," but they must
do so by developing the doctrine "consciously" and not by "mimicking federal doctrine." Id.
at 397.
Although considered well-settled law under Hudgens, federal state action doctrine as ap-
plied to shopping malls still has its critics. For a very recent discussion of the Supreme
Court's misapplication of the federal state action doctrine to shopping malls, see Alexan-
der, supra note 9, at 23-26. Professor Alexander argues that, with respect to modern
shopping malls, there is sufficient state action to trigger First Amendment protection:
(1) [Tjhere is significant state action in physical removals as well as the courts' in-
volvement with orders preventing expressive activity; (2) there is state entanglement
in the special deals and other assistance provided by the state to developers; (3)
there is significant government entanglement in terms of the state tenants; (4) the
modern mall essentially serves a public function of the new downtown; and (5) case
law implicitly acknowledges the existence of state action.
Id. at 42-43. Alexander concludes that "[s]tate action is a paper shield which should not
serve to protect property owners." Id. at 43.
211. SeeFailinger, supra note 34, at 275 ("[M]odern Westerners experience public time
as a transit tube .. "). Failinger further notes "that even 'quintessential' public forums are
simply empty passages or arteries, not places of human community." Id. at 272.
212. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 724 (1989) (holding that the sidewalk
leading to the post office was not the same as sidewalks traditionally held to be public fo-
rums and thus subject to regulation).
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and allowing our freedom to be ever more determined by private
owners. State courts that refuse to engage in an active reevaluation
of state constitutional principles subject their populations to a dif-
ferent kind of progress, a progress marked by the growing
privatization of many aspects of our previously public lives.2 '3 The
result is an irony: a conservatism that unmoors us from founda-
tional constitutional protections, sweeping us into the sea of
capital, whose tides are determined not by notions of public dis-
course, but by the wax and wane of the market and dictates of
private property owners.
By acknowledging that malls offer more than shopping and that,
for the vast number of nonurban Americans, parks and sidewalks
do not in reality serve as places of effective public action, the states
that extend free speech rights to mall citizens understand that evo-
lution means something other than setting our public citizenship
out to private sea. It means conserving not a traditional doctrine,
but our rights. The law "must either allow new forums for political
expression ... or remain silent as the traditional realm for grass-
roots political activity withers away."21 4 As Justice Bablitch wrote in a
separate opinion in Jacobs v. Major,215 the framers of the Wisconsin
Constitution understood "that government was not the only entity
that can substantially infringe on individual liberties." 216 Justice
Bablitch further stressed that "[a] ccumulations of economic power
213. It is no small coincidence that "in the last thirty years ... Americans have turned
increasingly to the security and style of life offered by private communities, neighborhoods,
and living associations." Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 28, at 512. In an article that predicts
the courts' treatment of private communities by examining the shopping mall cases as likely
precedent, the authors state that
perhaps the most important reason for the dramatic growth of these planned and
protected communities today are the controls and barriers that these communities
can offer their residents: an answer to the growing sense of vulnerability and insecu-
rity that many increasingly feel. These associations... are comparable to the "walled
cities of the medieval world, constructed to keep the hordes at bay."
Id. at 514. (citing Dennis R.Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities, in SPATIAL PRACTICES 144,
160 (Helen Liggett & David C. Perry eds., 1995)). The authors also note the importance of
security in these communities, pointing to a study in which "92 percent of the home buyers
in a private senior citizens community rated security as 'very important,' and described the
development as one 'surrounded by "six-foot block walls topped with two-foot-high bands of
barbed wire,"' and 'more than three hundred private security officers patrol[ling] the
grounds.'" Id. at 514 n.29 (citing EVAN McKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS
AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 141 (1994)).
214. Berger, supra note 55, at 661.
215. 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987) (deciding ultimately not to extend free speech pro-
tection to shopping malls).
216. Id. at 853 (Bablitch,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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by nongovernmental entities can ... pose as great a threat to indi-
vidual liberty as can government."
2 1 7
Using common sense and avoiding a rigid public-private di-
chotomy, state courts that choose to depart from traditional state
action doctrine in fact conserve their citizens' rights by correctly
locating the substantive locus of our public existence. They see
beyond the disingenuous claims of the shopping mall industry
that malls are purely commercial ventures. It is no wonder that
mall designers and promoters can tap our collective sense of
public citizenship, our nostalgic affinity for small town commu-
nity, in order to attract customers and thereby increase profits. It
is no wonder that local government agencies choose to locate
their offices "where the people are."218 Given the growing central-
ity of malls to our public lives, state courts should not so
cavalierly dismiss a relevant shift in state free speech jurispru-
dence. As Professor Frank Askin has stated, "state courts now
have an alternative model for defining the real public forum in a
new millennium where the title to formerly public space resides
more and more in private hands."219 And as electronic commerce
grows, removing malls from the concept of public space serves to
217. Id. (citing ROBERT C. NESBIT, WISCONSIN: A HISTORY (1973); M. QUAIFE, THE
CONVENTION OF 1846, at 365 (1919); ALICE E. SMITH, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN 273-306
(William Fletcher Thompson ed., 1973)). In a graphic example of the selling off of public
space, Salt Lake City recently sold a portion of its downtown Main Street to the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. All Things Considered (National Public Radio,July 21, 1999).
The Church plans to build a pedestrian mall, with the city retaining (as part of the $8.1
million deal) a limited public easement allowing public access to the property. The devel-
opment is touted to "bring 'a little bit of Paris'" to downtown Salt Lake City. Letter from
Stephen C. Clark, Legal Director, ACLU of Utah, to Mayor Deedee Corradini and Salt Lake
City Council (May 5, 1999) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
However, the city agreed to allow the Church to establish restrictions on behavior it deems
objectionable, and to allow Church security guards to oust violators. Id. The deed permits
the Church to prohibit,- among other things, "loitering, assembling, ... demonstrating,
picketing, distributing literature,... erecting signs or displays, using loudspeakers or other
devices to project music, sound, or spoken messages, engaging in any ... offensive, inde-
cent, .. . lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct ... ." Id. (quoting section 2.2 of the
deed). In a subsequent letter, Stephen Clark argues that the retention of the public ease-
ment "only bolsters the case for constitutional protection." Letter from Stephen C. Clark to
Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney, Salt Lake City (May 26, 1999) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). By agreeing to transform itself into the Church's tenant,
Salt Lake City has provided a vivid demonstration of public rights being subsumed into
private norms that are intended to control speech and behavior that are inimical to the
property owner's goals.
218. Telephone interview with Kathy Darnell, supra note 20 (explaining the city's ra-
tionale for opening City Hall at the Mall).
219. Frank Askin, The Privatization of Public Space and its Impact on Free Speech, N.J. LAW.
MAG.,June 1997, at 14.
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reduce further the opportunities for citizens to engage each/. 220
other personally in democratic discourse.
As electronic commerce transforms the Internet from the last
great frontier for free speech into a vast network of marketing ar-
rangements and shopping platforms, the need for physical public
space becomes even more acute. 22 ' As the owners of land-based
shopping malls-who have, by design and demographic accident,
replaced the traditional town square-profit from the human need
for a physical community, they should also be required to pay the
minimal cost of providing a space for real public discourse, unme-
diated by corporate sponsorship. For these reasons, and for the
more traditional reasons articulated by the New Jersey Supreme
Court,22 2 state supreme courts that consider the issue in the future
should think twice before blindly adopting wholesale the inflexible
rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court.
220. For example, in addition to direct access to retailers' websites, many shoppers on
the Internet enter the market through carefully controlled "[p]ortal[s]" and "shopping
platforms." Barbara Whitaker, Next New Era: For the Small Retailer, Life on the Internet is One Big
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at H9. While a shopper may be able to air complaints and
criticism elsewhere about their shopping experience, it is unlikely that by entering the mar-
ket directly, via a shopping portal, or by entering a shoppers' forum, a shopper will be
confronted with anti-fur protestors, anti-war protestors, union organizers, or persons seek-
ing signatures on a petition. In fact, it is more likely that the shopper will be navigating a
complex and interrelated web of corporate sponsorship and marketing arrangements, all
carefully controlled by the portal owner. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, Behind 'Name Your Own
Price'Lies a Mesh of Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at H24 ("More and more, when cus-
tomers call up a Web site, they see a single entrance to a structure made up of many
businesses in a tangle of alliances and subsidies."). Even if they are confronted by messages
of protest, the effect of the message is no doubt diluted by the impersonal nature of the
contact. Worse, issues of local concern are pushed even further into obscurity as the infor-
mative or educational chance encounter becomes even less likely.
221. Shopping center industry analysts note that despite the growth of on-line shop-
ping, retailers are "betting on growing in-store sales." Int'l Council of Shopping Centers,
Report: Internet Growing, but Impact on Retail REIFs Will Be Minimal (Mar. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.icsc.org/srch/front/1999/9903050245.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2001)(on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). "'Major retailers... [aire signing 10-
year leases, committing real dollars in anticipation that store-based volume will grow signifi-
cantly."' Id. (quoting REIT analyst Eric Hernel of Merrill Lynch & Co.). And for the 1999
holiday season, when on-line sales soared into the billions, sales per square foot of shopping
center increased by about two percent. Int'l Council of Shopping Centers, Mhite Papers: Re-
view of 1999 Holiday Season (2000), at http://icsc.org/srch/rsrch/wp/99holsalesreview.html
(last visitedJan. 5, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
222. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey Coalition).
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CONCLUSION
The growth of shopping malls as leisure space is ever increasing
and the explosion of shopping as a national pastime is evident.223
Even the superficially implausible notion suggested by science fic-
tion writers-that in order to achieve an ideal living or shopping
arrangement, we will gladly trade fundamental freedoms in ex-
change for heightened security and surveillance--is, in fact, not far
from reality. 2 4 If evolution means that our public citizenship be-
comes relegated to the status of a guest or a tenant of private
property, gratefully leasing space in the controlled environment of
the shopping dome, then perhaps evolution as depicted in the
corrupted arcology of Todos Santos is not so much science fiction
as it might first appear.2 In that future, evolution finds the private
bastion of anti-constitutional principles to be the victor.
The U.S. Supreme Court long ago retreated from a flexible view
of the state action doctrine under federal law, one that would af-
ford First Amendment protection to shopping mall visitors; in the
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process, the Court left little, if any, room to revisit the issue. The
223. Citing statistics from various industry sources, the court in New Jersey Coalition noted:
In 1950, privately-owned shopping centers of any size numbered fewer than 100 across
the country. By 1967, 105 of the larger regional and super-regional malls existed. This
number increased to 199 in 1972 and to 333 in 1978. By 1992, the number expanded to
at least 1,835 [sic]. Thus from 1972 to 1992 the number of regional and super-regional
malls in the nation increased by roughly 800%.
... [M]alls are where the people can be found today. Indeed, 70% of the national
adult population shop at regional malls and do so .... about once a week.
650 A.2d 757, 766-67 (1994) (citations omitted).
224. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing private communities); see
also Hannigan, supra note 26, at 7 ("Another significant component of the Disney model is
its elaborate but largely invisible surveillance and control system."). For example, at the
World Edmonton Mall, "the first shopping mall to devote a major portion of its space to
entertainment, security guards sit behind a glass wall in Central Dispatch, monitoring banks
of closed-circuit televisions and computers which reach into every corner of the mall." Id.
225. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
226. See Friedelbaum, supra note 32, at 1263.
[I] t is improbable that the United States Supreme Court will be persuaded to intervene
in future shopping center cases .... A major dilution of traditional state action re-
quirements would be necessary to meet federal standards of justiciability .... [Tihe
Supreme Court is unlikely to intercede substantively in what has become and doubtless
will remain a public-private dichotomous conundrum. The extent of expressional lib-
erty in shopping centers will continue to depend primarily, if not exclusively, on the
state courts and the constitutional guarantees that they have come to protect.
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New Jersey Supreme Court reached the correct conclusion in New
Jersey Coalition27 with its estoppel theory: private property owners
should not be permitted to exploit the nostalgia of town squares or
of community on the one hand and simultaneously deny that such
a marketing strategy has any meaningful effect on the other. If pri-
vate owners are understandably concerned about the effects of the
exercise of free speech on their profits, then they should stop try-
ing to be the new town square and forego the benefits of
associations with city, county, or state offices that provide citizens
with services. If private owners continue to exploit the benefits of
public space for private profit, then state courts should exercise
their state constitutions by balancing free speech rights against pri-
vate ownership so that the latter does not always and inexorably
"settle the question."2 2 s At the present time, only state courts may
stop the evolutionary market process before it becomes so en-
trenched that it cannot be undone, leaving us in most states with a
pre-themed, privately owned brand of citizenship. As the market
swallows and exploits the nostalgia of public space, and as what
remains falls more and more into the shadow of the commodity,
we may find that, rather than enjoying the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, we are limited
to undisturbed shopping in the United Mall of America.
227. 650 A.2d 757 (1994). "The flow of free speech in today's society is too important to
be cut off simply to enhance the shopping ambience in our state's shopping centers." Id. at
780.
228. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946).
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